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Accountable Through Facial Challenges
by CAITLIN E. BORGMANN*
Introduction
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance assumes that legislatures
intend to draft laws that meet constitutional standards and, therefore, that
courts should construe statutes whenever possible to avoid finding
constitutional infirmities.' Yet it should be obvious that legislatures do not
always act with a pure heart. The democratic system is by its nature bound
to produce laws now and again that reflect bias, ignorance, or hostility to
certain groups or certain conduct.2  Moreover, legislatures sometimes
deliberately defy United States Supreme Court pronouncements with which
they disagree.3 When such influences produce laws that infringe individual
constitutional rights, it is the courts' job to step in to invalidate these laws.
This Article argues that facial challenges and facial invalidations can
help to promote constitutional accountability among legislatures. The
traditional view of statutes as embodying constitutional and
unconstitutional applications is unhelpful and misleading when such
* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D., New York
University School of Law. I am grateful to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly for inviting me to participate in this symposium, and to Maya Manian for her
thoughtful response to this Article. Thanks also to Steve Shapiro and David Faigman for helping
me think through some of the topics addressed here.
1. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1961 (1997).
2. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84
IND. L.J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding]; Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy,
17 BROOKLYN J.L. & POL'Y 101 (2008) [hereinafter Borgmann, Judicial Evasion].
3. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79
S. CAL. L. REv. 753 (2006) [hereinafter Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance]; Note, After Ayotte:
The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed "Purpose," 119 HARv. L. REv. 2552, 2562-
65 (2006) [hereinafter Note, After Ayotte]; William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions
as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 898 (2001); Note, Should the Supreme
Court Presume That Congress Acts Constitutionally?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1798, 1800 (2003).
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statutes deliberately or recklessly infringe individual rights. When a
legislature defies constitutional requirements that the Supreme Court has
clearly laid out, or when a legislature's stated justifications for a rights-
infringing law are not supported by a solid factual foundation, a legislature
repudiates its duty to uphold the United States Constitution. That
shortcoming infects the entire law; it is not limited to some subset of
potential applications. It is the courts' duty in such cases, not to reward or
accommodate the legislature's failure, but to protect individual rights from
it. Complete, pre-enforcement invalidation of the law in such
circumstances satisfies constitutional norms and vindicates the courts'
critical role in protecting individual rights from majority oppression.4
The Roberts Court, however, has thus far moved in the opposite
direction, viewing facial challenges with increased skepticism and hostility.
The very early Roberts Court issued one decision in which it suggested that
its primary concern with facial challenges was the breadth of the remedy.5
The Court held that, in response to a facial challenge to a statute's
constitutionality, the Court should issue a narrower remedy whenever
possible.6 In later cases, however, the Court has gone further, simply
denying facial challenges outright without considering the possibility of
more limited relief.7 In these cases, the Court has focused more on the pre-
enforcement nature and broad-ranging context of facial challenges,
expressing a preference for "concrete evidence" that a law has harmed, or
will likely harm, particular classes of individuals.8 While placing a heavy
burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate actual or likely harm, the Court has
tended to defer to legislative factual assertions regarding the purposes that
underlie rights-infringing laws, even where those purposes are quite likely
pretextual. 9 The Roberts Court's intolerance for facial challenges thus does
more than perpetuate the Court's longstanding confusion over the standard
by which to assess such challenges; it permits the Court to withdraw from
its critical role in safeguarding individual rights.
The notoriously vexing question of facial and as-applied challenges
has received significant scholarly attention. Legal scholars have proposed
a variety of approaches to the problem of facial challenges. Michael Dorf
4. See sourced cited infra note 21.
5. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006); see also infra Part
IIA.
6. Ayotte, 546U.S. at331.
7. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Baze v.
Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct.
1184 (2008); Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see also infra Part II.B.
8. See, e.g., Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622; see also infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part 111.B.
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claims that the line between facial and as-applied challenges is not nearly
as clear as the Supreme Court has suggested, and he argues that courts
should stop conceptualizing these as distinct categories of cases.'l Richard
Fallon has argued that facial and as-applied challenges largely track (or
should track) the substantive constitutional tests the Court applies in a
given case." Matthew Adler has argued that there is no such thing as a
substantive "as-applied" challenge, and he focuses instead on the different
types of remedies courts employ.12  Gillian Metzger believes there is a
logical distinction between facial and as-applied challenges (although one
that the Court does not always accurately identify), and she argues that
ordinary rules of severability provide a sound guide for the Court in
deciding the appropriate remedy when presented with a facial challenge.13
A critical question in the facial challenge puzzle is the role of
constitutional norms. 14  The Supreme Court has often claimed that
separation of powers concerns require courts to tread lightly in invalidating
laws, and, therefore, that as-applied rulings are the preferred remedy for
constitutional challenges. 15 But this Article argues that laws that violate
important individual rights uniquely and distinctly warrant facial
invalidation.1 6  The Court and commentators have often, however,
overlooked this point. Metzger, for example, tries to reconcile the Court's
approach to facial challenges in the context of congressional powers cases,
where Congress has acted to protect or expand rights, with its approach in
cases alleging violations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Bill of Rights, without considering whether constitutional norms warrant
treating these contexts differently.17 Adler asserts that an examination has
not yet been made of whether his model of analyzing facial and as-applied
10. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235
(1994).
11. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REv. 1321 (2000).
12. Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure Of Constitutional Adjudication: A
Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1371 (2000).
13. Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2005).
14. See Fallon, supra note 11, at 1351-52.
15. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006); see
also Metzger, supra note 13, at 878.
16. See Fallon, supra note 11, at 1352.
17. See Metzger, supra note 13 (arguing that Section 5 and other congressional power
challenges should be subject to ordinary presumption of severability); cf Borgmann, Legislative
Fact-Finding, at 4, 38-39, 49-50 (arguing that Court should view legislative fact-finding
skeptically where legislation threatens individual rights, but that more deference might be
warranted where legislation expands or protects individual rights).
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challenges will more likely promote constitutional norms than those of
Fallon and others, and he stresses the importance of such an inquiry. 
18
I argue that constitutional norms suggest a role for facial challenges in
maintaining the proper balance of power between the judiciary and the
legislature when laws infringe important individual rights.19 Richard
Fallon has recognized this role for facial challenges, albeit under more
limited conditions:
[W]here constitutional values are unusually vulnerable, the Supreme
Court can authorize the robust protection afforded by tests that invite
rulings of facial invalidity and preclude the case-by-case curing of
statutory defects. This approach most commends itself when a
constitutional provision both affords protection to speech or conduct
that is especially prone to "chill" and reflects a value that legislatures
may be unusually disposed to undervalue in the absence of a
significant judicially established disincentive.
20
The courts have a special responsibility to protect individual rights from
21majoritarian oppression. When courts deny facial challenges in such
18. See Adler, supra note 12, at 1420 ("Comparing these outcomes is clearly a difficult task.
But it is not, I believe, a task we can avoid.... [L]egal scholars (and the Supreme Court) must
undertake an empirical and instrumental assessment of proposed doctrinal structures, one that
seeks to determine which structure best promotes the norms and values (moral or otherwise)
given force by the Bill of Rights.").
19. This Article assumes that courts play an important role in checking majoritarian abuses
of individual rights. In particular, it assumes that courts, while by no means perfect protectors of
individual rights, do a better job than the legislatures of dispassionately assessing the supposed
factual bases for rights-infringing legislation. See generally Borgmann, Legislative Fact-
Finding, supra note 2; Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2. An evaluation of the
effectiveness of judicial review in protecting individual rights, especially those of unpopular
minorities or groups lacking political power, is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent
examination of judicial review and individual rights, in particular female and lesbian sexual
freedom, see Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 1
(2007).
20. Fallon, supra note 11, at 1352 (footnotes omitted). I disagree with Fallon, however, that
substantive constitutional tests as presently articulated by the Court always correctly determine
when facial invalidation is appropriate. See infra Part IV; Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding,
supra note 2, at 48, 55.
21. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
68 (1980); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 175-76 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Difficulty,
60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 954-58, 964-66 (2008); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 355 (1997); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative
Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 801 (2006); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1706-08
(2008); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the US. Federal
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 13 (2006); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L.
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contexts, they reward legislatures for passing unconstitutional laws, since
the laws will remain on the books even after successful (as-applied)
challenges by one or more litigants.22 This approach also inappropriately
assigns legislative functions to the courts.23 Legislatures that pass blatantly
unconstitutional laws should not rely on the courts to rewrite them to fit
constitutional guidelines.24 When unpopular minorities or controversial
rights are at issue, legislatures may knowingly enact unconstitutional
legislation in response to public hysteria and/or constituent pressure,
comforted by the thought that the courts will step in to clean up the mess.
25
Instead of taking constitutional responsibility and upholding their oath to
remain loyal to the United States Constitution,26 they leave the courts to do
their dirty work.27
When laws infringe significant individual rights, 28 courts have reason
to be concerned that the legislation has a proper justification and is not
REV. 1169, 1174 (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2005)); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.").
22. See Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2564-65.
23. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329-30 (2006);
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971); Adler, supra note 12; Brief of Respondents at 32-42,
Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320 (No. 04-1144).
24. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997); see also Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3,
at 2560 (discussing "institutional convenience" to courts of granting facial invalidations in
abortion cases rather than engaging in difficult line--drawing).
25. See Neal Devins, How Pennsylvania v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars,
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at n.36) (discussing states in which "prevailing
political norms backed the enactment of legislation at odds with Supreme Court decision-
making" on abortion); see also Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2564 (noting that Ayotte
removes "disincentive to pushing the envelope in every abortion statute").
26. See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 3.
27. For example, an electronic newsletter commented on a state legislative hearing
addressing the sale of video games:
The Louisiana State House has voted unanimously to approve a bill that would ban the
sale of violent video games to minors, and classify such games in the same category as
pornography.... Although debate in the House included talk that similar bills have
routinely been struck down by the courts as unconstitutional, the House voted 102-0 to
approve the bill. "That's for the courts to decide," said Rep. Danny Martiny (R-
Kenner), the Associated Press reported.
Digital Media Wire Daily, http://www.digitalmediawire.com/archives_051806.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009) (emphasis added).
28. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the particular individual rights that
warrant closer purpose scrutiny, and facial invalidation, by the courts. In another Article, I offer a
tentative description of such rights. See Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note 2, at
36-37. In any event, the set should not be narrowed to include only "fundamental" rights or
those otherwise accorded heightened scrutiny. The Court is rapidly moving away from such neat
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based on animus or hostility to unpopular rights or politically powerless
minorities, or even simply on a mistaken factual foundation. The
legislative process does not lend itself to dispassionate, neutral fact-
finding.29 A legislature bent on restricting rights lacks both the incentive
and the capacity to question its own fact-based justifications. 30 Even where
a proper purpose is asserted as the basis for a rights-infringing law, if the
alleged purpose rests on a shaky or nonexistent factual footing, the entire
law is called into question. Scholars have pointed out that when a law's
invalidity infects the statute as a whole, facial (complete) invalidation is
appropriate. 31 A law that infringes individual rights and that lacks a valid
purpose concordantly should be struck down on its face.
In such circumstances, denying facial invalidation abets the legislature
for no good reason. It is not clear how the Court will enhance its analysis
of the alleged constitutional defect by demanding a case-specific challenge
(whether pre- or post-enforcement). Facial challenges alleging violations
of individual rights are usually making a broader claim about the law's
invalidity.32 Similarly, when a law rests upon a faulty factual premise, that
flaw is not limited to a specific application or litigant. If courts look more
skeptically at the factual bases for state-declared interests underlying
rights-infringing laws, they will smoke out illegitimate purposes that infect
an entire statute. At the same time, examining a law's factual
underpinnings is a more objective and manageable enterprise than trying to
pin down a legislature's actual purpose, a notoriously vexing inquiry.
33
The concerns favoring facial invalidations are lessened when
legislatures wield their power to expand individual rights. In fact, the
concern may run the opposite way in such cases, demanding more judicial
deference and thus a greater reluctance by the courts to facially invalidate
categorization of rights, and it has at times acknowledged the importance of rights not so
classified and has treated them with commensurate gravity. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); see also Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 312-16; Borgmann, Legislative Fact-
Finding, supra note 2, at 10-11, 37.
29. See generally Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note 2; see also Neal Devins,
Essay: Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50
DuKE L.J. 1169, 1182-87 (2001); Laycock, supra note 21, at 1172-77.
30. Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note 2, at 35-46; Devins, supra note 29, at
1182-87; Laycock, supra note 21, at 1172-77.
31. Doff, supra note 10, at 279-81 (discussing "purpose" tests); Marc E. Isserles,
Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U.L. REV.
359, 386-88,425-43 (1998).
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part IV.
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such measures. 34 This is because the majority does not need the courts to
protect it from itself. When the majority is acting to limit its own interests
or to promote the interests of the disadvantaged or politically powerless, it
has less incentive to engage in rash decision-making based on shoddy or
pretextual fact-finding or specious factual assumptions. Accordingly,
legislative policymaking prerogative is at its height and a firm judicial hand
may well be unnecessary and inappropriate.
35
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part L.A discusses the confusing
terminology of "facial" and "as-applied" challenges and offers a different
taxonomy to describe constitutional challenges to statutes. Part I.B
describes the Salerno standard, by which the Court purports to assess facial
challenges, as well as some scholarly interpretations of the Salerno
standard. Part II summarizes several major Roberts Court rulings on facial
challenges and considers the possible significance of these rulings. Part III
surveys some of the problems with the Roberts Court's apparent hostility to
facial challenges, including demands for a showing of actual harm and the
false promise of later, as-applied challenges. Part III then discusses
categories of cases for which as-applied challenges will not provide an
adequate remedy. Finally, Part IV argues that facial challenges are an
important tool by which the courts can reinforce constitutional norms by
ensuring constitutional accountability among legislatures and protecting
individual rights.
I. Facial and As-Applied Challenges
A. Categorizing Constitutional Challenges to Statutes
Much has been written about what the terms "facial" and "as-applied"
mean in the context of constitutional challenges. 36  Michael Doff has
suggested that the "facial" and "as-applied" terminology is more confusing
than helpful,37 and there is indeed something to this claim. The Supreme
Court has not helped matters by using a single term to refer to analytically
distinct things. For example, the term "facial challenge" has often been
used to refer to the pre-enforcement nature of a challenge.38 Yet it is
34. See Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference, supra note 2, at 38, 49-50; Borgmann,
Legislative Arrogance, supra note 3, at 800-0 1.
35. See infta Part V.
36. See generally Adler, supra note 12; Dorf, supra note 10; Fallon, supra note 11; Marc E.
Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am.
U.L. REv. 359 (1998); Metzger, supra note 13; Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3.
37. Dorf, supra note 10, at 294.
38. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
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possible for a person to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a law solely
as it applies to her. Thus, a plaintiff might challenge a voter ID
requirement in advance of an election on the basis that it would be
especially burdensome for her to obtain an ID because of her particular
circumstances. 39 The term "facial challenge" is also often used to mean
complete invalidation of a law, yet in the past the Supreme Court has
contemplated a type of "facial" challenge that addressed only a subset of a
statute's possible applications. 40  The term "as-applied" has been used to
mean a challenge to a subset of applications as well as to mean the statute's
application solely to the party before it.41 Finally, courts and commentators
also do not always clearly distinguish between facial or as-applied
challenges and the remedy a court may grant upon finding a statute
unconstitutional.42
Challenges asserting that a law is unconstitutional can be divided into
the following categories:
(A) pre-enforcement challenges, including: (1) full pre-enforcement
challenges in which a plaintiff seeks total invalidation of a law before it
goes into effect;43 (2) limited pre-enforcement challenges, in which a
plaintiff claims that the law operates unconstitutionally as to a subset of
applications or contexts, not linguistically distinguished on the face of the
statute; (3) case-specific pre-enforcement challenges, in which a party
claims the law is unconstitutional solely with reference to her own case;
44
(B) post-enforcement challenges, 45 which similarly divide into: (1) full
post-enforcement challenges; (2) limited post-enforcement challenges; (3)
case-specific post-enforcement challenges.46
39. Cf Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (upholding law for
lack of demonstrated burden).
40. Metzger, supra note 13, at 881-82.
41. See id. at 880-82.
42. See Isserles, supra note 31, at 451-55; Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2553.
43. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (CarhartIl), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Wash. State Grange,
128 S. Ct. 1184; Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610; Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
44. Such pre-enforcement challenges are not as common, perhaps reflecting the reality that
pre-enforcement actions will most likely be brought by interest groups who represent a broader
swath of potentially affected people, and who are aware of and have the resources to fight the
law.
45. The term "post-enforcement" is admittedly ambiguous. It could mean after a statute has
gone into effect and stands ready to be enforced at any time, although it has not yet specifically
been enforced against the litigants. This sense of the term has resonance in the context of laws
that impose a chilling effect, for allowing such a statute to take effect may be as or more effective
in preventing the targeted conduct as actual prosecution. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97 (1940). See generally Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance, supra note 3. Alternatively, "post-
enforcement" may mean that the statute has actually been enforced against the litigant. See, e.g.,
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Pre-enforcement challenges, including case-specific challenges, are all
"facial" in the sense that the statute has not been applied to anyone. In the
absence of specific facts regarding actual enforcement, the statute is
therefore "measured by its text'' 7 (or "on its face"). Moreover, even partial
pre-enforcement challenges may be "facial" in the sense that the subset of
applications they target may represent a "general rule ... embodied in the
statute. '  Remedies granted in response to challenges alleging
unconstitutionality can likewise be (1) total or full (invalidating the statute
or provision in all its applications); 49 (2) partial (invalidating the statute
only as applied to a certain set of applications); 50 or (3) case-specific
(invalidated only as applied to the claimant).5
A challenge to a particular, linguistically separate provision of a law
that does not claim unconstitutionality as to the remainder of the statute
52should be seen as no different than a challenge to an entire statute.
Linguistically distinct subrules of a statute should simply be treated as
independent provisions or "laws" within that statute.53 They, in turn, may
be challenged or invalidated in whole, in part, or only as applied to a
particular litigant.
Full and limited pre-enforcement challenges can take two different
forms. Marc Isserles has described these as (1) overbreadth challenges
(where a litigant asks a court to examine a law's application to persons or
situations not before the court) and (2) valid rule facial challenges (where a
litigant identifies a flaw "on the face" of the statute by "measuring the
statutory terms against the applicable constitutional doctrine," so that the
invalidity is not dependent upon the examination of particular applications
of a statute).54 In addition, the first category can be broken down into two
Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (plaintiffs sentenced to death by lethal injection); Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (organization forbidden to remove gay scoutmaster).
46. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
47. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 1l), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1632 (2007).
48. Metzger, supra note 13, at 902.
49. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960).
51. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
52. See Adler, supra note 12, at 1378, 1380.
53. See id. In such cases, severability principles may ultimately determine whether the
provision's invalidity requires the statute's total invalidation or merely invalidation (and
severance) of the offending provision. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320, 329 (2006); Metzger, supra note 13, at 884-85.
54. Isserles, supra note 36, at 365-67; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (introducing concept of valid rule facial challenges). Isserles argues for a
reconception of the Salerno doctrine as one that applies in the context of valid rule facial
challenges.
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further subcategories: cases in which a plaintiff alleges the statute is
unconstitutional both as to her and in some subset of other circumstances
55
and cases in which a plaintiff does not allege the statute is unconstitutional
as to her, but invokes unconstitutionality in other contexts in arguing for
invalidation. The second represents the classic conception of overbreadth
premised on third-party standing. 6
B. The Salerno Test and Facial Challenges
The Supreme Court has famously wrestled with how it should handle
requests to invalidate a statute completely. One view, best known for its
description in United States v. Salerno, is that full invalidations should be
exceedingly rare, and that the Court should grant them only where "the
challenger ... establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid., 57 By referring to sets of circumstances in which
statutes are valid or invalid, the Court in Salerno seemed to focus on a
statute's range of potential applications and the relative sweep of its
constitutional and unconstitutional applications. Most scholars have
assumed that this is what the language in Salerno was intended to mean.58
However, they have also pointed out that the Court has not consistently
applied this standard to full pre-enforcement challenges because it has
often fully invalidated statutes, even outside of the First Amendment
context, that could operate constitutionally in some circumstances.
In particular, the standard seems at odds with the approach that the
Court took to the facial challenge it confronted in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.59 There, the Court asked whether an abortion restriction poses an
undue burden to women in a "large fraction" of cases in which the rule is
"relevant." 60 The "large fraction" test thus contemplates that a rule may be
fully invalidated even where it operates constitutionally in some fraction of
cases. That appears inconsistent with Salerno's requirement that a law
55. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931).
56. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-87 (1997); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 & nn. 6-7 (1982); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97 (1940). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853 (1991); Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
57. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The Court has recognized an
exception to this rule in First Amendment overbreadth cases. Id.
58. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional
Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 654 n.127 (2009) ("The Salerno rule contemplates that facial
challenges are merely the sum of all of the parts of as-applied challenges.").
59. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
60. Id. at 895.
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operate validly in "no set of circumstances" in order to qualify for full
invalidation.61
Isserles has offered an alternative interpretation of the Salerno
standard as one that refers to what he calls "valid rule facial challenges. 62
According to Isserles, what the Salerno Court meant to address (although
its language does not consistently reflect this) are cases in which a flaw in
the rule itself renders the rule totally invalid. In such a circumstance, any
consideration of the rule's applications is beside the point. Because the
constitutional flaw infects the entire rule, it cannot validly be applied to
anyone. Under this view, the Salerno standard does not come into play
where a statute can operate validly in some circumstances, because such a
case by definition does not present a valid rule facial challenge. The
apparent inconsistency between Casey and Salerno is resolved under
Isserles's interpretation of Salerno. Because the Court in Casey asked
whether the various abortion restrictions at issue there had the effect of
posing an undue burden, the Court was considering different applications
of the rule rather than contemplating whether the rule as a whole was
invalid.63
II. The Roberts Court's Hostility to Facial Challenges
While in many respects the defining characteristics of the Roberts
Court are still nascent, the Court's hostility to full, preinforcement
challenges appears already in full bloom.64 Two cases early in the Roberts
Court's tenure seemed to suggest that the Court prefers to grant partial
relief when presented with a constitutional challenge. In the first, an
abortion case, the Court denied a full, pre-enforcement injunction and
remanded for possible narrower relief.65 In the second, the Court purported
to grant case-specific relief in an as-applied constitutional challenge to the
McCain-Feingold Act, a statute the Supreme Court had upheld in 2003
against a full pre-enforcement challenge.66 More perniciously, in several
prominent cases presenting full pre- or post-enforcement challenges, the
61. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 275-76.
62. Isserles, supra note 31, at 363-64. I will refer to the former understanding of Salerno as
the "traditional" Salerno standard.
63. Id. at 451, 457-59. Isserles argues that the "purpose" prong of Casey, which looks at
whether a law was enacted with the purpose of imposing an undue burden, would present a valid
rule facial challenge. See infra Part IV; see also generally Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3
(arguing for refocus on "purpose" prong in abortion cases).
64. See David G. Savage, About Face: A Tool of the Civil Rights Movement Is Increasingly
Unwelcome in the High Court, ABA JOURNAL (July 2008).
65. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
66. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL I1), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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Court has simply denied relief, ruling that complete invalidation is
inappropriate, without contemplating a possible narrower remedy. 67  Part
II.A describes the two early Roberts Court cases that seemed to indicate a
trend toward as-applied rulings.68 Part I1B discusses cases in which the
Roberts Court has denied facial challenges to statutes alleged to infringe
individual constitutional rights.69  Part II.C considers some of the
implications of the Court's approach in the cases discussed in Parts
II.A&B.
A. Decisions Considering or Granting "As-Applied" Relief
While the Roberts Court's general approach to full, preinforcement
challenges has been simply to deny them outright, one of its early rulings
signaled hostility to facial challenges without sending the plaintiffs home
empty-handed. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England,70 the Supreme Court addressed a full pre-enforcement challenge
to a New Hampshire parental notification statute that lacked a health
exception. The Court refused to grant full, pre-enforcement invalidation.71
But rather than stopping at a denial of the facial challenge, the Court took a
softer approach, remanding for the possibility of a more limited injunction
(or even a full injunction, if the lower courts deemed appropriate).72 In
Stenberg v. Carhart ("Carhart r'), the Court had recently reaffirmed the
requirement that all abortion regulations contain a health exception7 3 and
had struck down Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban in its entirety for
lack of a such an exception.74 While in Ayotte the Court recognized that
67. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart fl), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1632 (2007); Wash.
State Grange, 128 S. Ct. 1184; Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520; Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610; see also David
Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts
Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 704, 707, 715 (2009) (referring to such rulings as "facial
adjudication in as-applied clothing"). But see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (the
four liberal Justices joining Justice Kennedy in fully invalidating the death penalty for child rape
in post-enforcement, case-specific challenge).
68. See infra Part II.A (discussing Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320, and WRTL 11, 127 S. Ct. 2652).
69. See infra Part II.B (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007);
Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. 1184; Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520; and Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)).
70. Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320, 323-35.
71. Id.at331.
72. Id. at 332.
73. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
74. Although the district court had issued only a limited injunction, Carhart v. Stenberg, 972
F. Supp. 507, 522-23 (D. Neb. 1997) (describing as-applied posture of case and noting that "a
favorable ruling for Carhart will ...only preclude enforcement of the Nebraska law against
Carhart and his patients (and other similarly situated doctors and their patients)"), both the Eighth
Circuit and the Supreme Court paid no attention to that aspect of the district court's decision and
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the absence of a health exception in New Hampshire law rendered the law
unconstitutional,75 the Court went on to "address a question of remedy,"
namely whether to invalidate the statute entirely or whether to remand to
the lower courts for possible "narrower declaratory and injunctive relief.,
76
In a unanimous decision, the Court opted to remand. Focusing on the
scope of the injunction, rather than on the pre- or post-enforcement nature
of plaintiffs challenge, the Court first emphasized that partial, rather than
total, invalidations are the "normal rule." 7 At the same time, the Court
recognized a second principle, namely that the courts should not rewrite
statutes in an attempt to salvage them. Only where line-drawing is
straightforward and supported by clear precedent could the Court craft a
narrow remedy tailored to a specific application of a law.78
The Court determined that the district court chose "the most blunt
remedy" in invalidating the New Hampshire law entirely.79 Although it
admitted that the Court itself had chosen this "blunt remedy" in Carhart I,
it pinned the blame partly on the parties in that case for not having sought
narrower relief.80 In Ayotte, on the other hand, New Hampshire argued that
the legislature had intentionally invited a limited injunction by including a
severability clause in the statute. The Court concluded that the New
Hampshire law need not have been invalidated "wholesale," since "only a
few applications . . . would present a constitutional problem.,
81
Accordingly, the Court remanded for the lower courts to consider whether
a partial injunction would accord with legislative intent.
82
While the Court's decision to remand suggested there was an open
constitutional question that might have affected the legislature's decision
whether to include a health exception, the lower courts' facial invalidation
was entirely predictable and consistent with the Court's abortion
precedents.83  More likely the remand served to mask substantive
instead appeared to treat the suit as a facial challenge, see Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142,
1144-45 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 923; see also Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 1018-19
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (remarking that "this case comes to us on a facial challenge").
75. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327-28.
76. Id. at 323.
77. Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 329-30.
79. Id. at 330.
80. Id. at 331.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000); see also Ayotte, 546
U.S. at 328 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint
opinion)); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69
575
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disagreements among the Justices, allowing the Court, so sharply divided
on abortion, to issue a unanimous decision. 84 Centering the decision on the
remedy, rather than on the nature of the challenge and what the plaintiff
must prove to support it, permitted the Court to avoid the divisive question
of whether it should apply the Salerno rule in this abortion case.85
The following year, the Court issued a decision that demonstrates the
difficulties of fashioning meaningful "as-applied" relief in what would
more naturally be litigated and decided as a full, pre-enforcement case. In
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life ("WRTL IT'), 86 the
Court considered a case-specific challenge brought by Wisconsin Right to
Life ("WRTL") to a provision of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 ("BCRA") barring "electioneering communications." The
Court had upheld the provision in 2003 against a facial challenge.87 WRTL
had broadcast ads that amounted to illegal electioneering communications
under the BCRA.88 It sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to its ads.
In an earlier per curiam opinion, Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal
Election Commission ("WRTL r'), the Supreme Court had ruled that its
decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission did not preclude as-
applied challenges. 89 The Court now found that the "capable of repetition
yet evading review" exception to Article III case or controversy
requirements was relevant not just to facial challenges but to as-applied
challenges as well. Therefore, the Court found that the case was not moot
even though the 2004 election had passed.90 As to the merits, while a
majority could not agree on why the provision violated the First
Amendment, a majority concluded that the barring of the WRTL ads was
unconstitutional. 9'
(1986); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983); Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976)).
84. See Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2557 n.33 (discussing commentator's
observation that decision was designed to allow Justice O'Connor to write it). The peace was
short-lived, as the divide soon erupted again when the Court decided Carhart II. See infra Part
lI.B.
85. See infra Part ll.B.
86. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL 11), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
87. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003). The provision in question makes it a
federal crime for any corporation to broadcast, shortly before an election, any communication that
is targeted to the electorate and names a federal candidate for elected office. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct.
at 2659.
88. WRTL I, 127 S. Ct. at2261.
89. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL 1), 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006) (per curiam).
90. WRTL I, 127 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 2658; id. at 2674 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Yet the Court's explanation of how an "as-applied" ruling in a moot
controversy would help in the future was muddled. The Court claimed that
there was a benefit to rendering a decision even if WRTL was unlikely to
produce identical advertisements in the future, so long as the group planned
to run "materially similar" future ads.92 The Court did suggest, however,
that its ruling would benefit only WRTL specifically.
93
B. Decisions Denying Facial Challenges
The Court's foray into as-applied remedies proved to be short-lived.
In its first outright denial of a "facial" challenge, the Court upheld the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales v. Carhart
("Carhart iJT,).94 The decision was 5-4, with Justice Kennedy writing for
the majority and Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dissenting.
Three different sets of plaintiffs had brought successful full pre-
enforcement challenges to the Act in three different federal district courts. 95
All three decisions were upheld in the respective Courts of Appeals. 96 In
Carhart II, the Court considered decisions in two of those cases, from the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The Eighth Circuit, in Carhart v. Gonzales,97
had issued a partial injunction, invalidating the Act as applied only to non-
viable fetuses. The Ninth Circuit, in Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales,98
had invalidated the Act in its entirety.
In considering the ban, the Supreme Court first addressed plaintiffs'
claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, reaching
too many procedures. 99 The Court found that the statute clearly prohibited
a defined procedure and did not ban the most common manner of
92. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion).
93. Id. (holding "that there exists a reasonable expectation that the same controversy
involving the same party will recur"); Justice Scalia, however, was skeptical of Chief Justice
Roberts's "as-applied" rhetoric, remarking, "seven Justices of this Court ... agree that the
opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so. This faux judicial restraint is judicial
obfuscation." Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). One year earlier, the
Court had refused to grant facial invalidation in the first instance in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). But the Court seemed to contemplate a possible
complete invalidation on remand. See id.
95. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (2004), aff'd, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (2004),
affd, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (2004), aff'd, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006).
96. See cases cited supra note 95.
97. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
98. Parenthood Fed'n of Am v. Ashcroft, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
99. Carhart l, 127 S. Ct. at 1627.
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performing abortions in the second trimester; it therefore denied the
plaintiffs' vagueness challenge. 00 Next, the Court considered whether the
statute impermissibly burdened access to abortion. While recognizing that
the statute implicated both pre- and post-viability abortions, each of which
are governed by distinct constitutional tests,' 0 ' the Court treated the case as
a full pre-enforcement challenge (which accorded with the relief plaintiffs
sought), 10 2 and it applied the undue burden standard applicable to pre-
viability abortions. The Court's vagueness conclusion aided the Court's
undue burden analysis: The Court found that, because the statute did not
prohibit safe and common methods of performing post-first-trimester
abortions, it imposed only insignificant burdens on women.1
03
Interestingly, the Court separately examined whether the statute was
enacted for a valid purpose, treating the "purpose" prong of the Casey
undue burden test as a formal and independent requirement. 14 While the
language of the Casey test appears to call for exactly that interpretation,
many have observed that the Court seemed to have abandoned the purpose
prong, or to have rendered it so toothless that any abortion challenge
alleging an invalid purpose is doomed to fail.'0 5 Yet in Carhart II the
Court suggested that legislative purpose was still potentially determinative,
stating,
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue
burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote
respect for life, including life of the unbom.'
0 6
100. Id. at 1629.
101. The case thus raised what Marc Isserles calls the Grace problem of multiple applicable
doctrinal standards. See Isserles, supra note 31, at 437-38, 459 (discussing United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)).
102. See Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1632-35; see B. Jessie Hill, Medical Treatment Decisions. A Tale of Two
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 321 (2007).
105. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971-72 (1997); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter
Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675,
691 & n.107 (2004) [hereinafter Borgmann, Abortion Rights); Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion,
Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865, 892 (2007); Note, After Ayotte,
supra note 3, at 2566.
106. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1633 (emphasis added).
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Admittedly, the Court applied a very low threshold for a qualifying
purpose, suggesting that the purpose need only be rational.' 07 But it also
implied that an intention to impose an undue burden on abortion access was
not a legitimate interest and would alone invalidate a statute.1
0 8
The Court found that Congress's asserted objectives in passing the ban
were legitimate. These justifications included "express[ing] respect for the
dignity of human life,"' 09 "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession,"' 1° and promoting a woman's informed decision-making about
the moral aspects of abortion."' In evaluating these objectives, the Court
showed great deference to Congress, refusing to examine closely or
skeptically the factual premises upon which the justifications rested." 2
Indeed, the Court deferred to a factual justification that admittedly lacked
scientific support and which the government itself had not pressed, namely
that abortions cause women to suffer mental trauma. "
3
In applying the "effects" prong of the Casey standard, the Court also
deferred to Congress, arriving at its finding of "medical disagreement" over
the ban's health implications by according significant weight to Congress's
medical assertions about the ban, including that certain abortion techniques
could be banned without endangering women's health." 4 As part of its
effects analysis, the Court considered whether Congress's failure to include
a health exception rendered the Act unconstitutional by imposing
unconstitutional medical risks on women seeking abortions. This marked
"a clear reversal of [the Court's] prior approach to abortion cases,",115
107. See Hill, supra note 104, at 321.
108. See id.
109. Carhart I, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
110. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
111. Id. at 1634.
112. See Borgmann, Judicial Deference, supra note 2, at 15, 27-28, 45; Borgmann, Judicial
Evasion, supra note 2, at 111-16.
113. See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (admitting that "we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon" of post-abortion emotional trauma); Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2,
at 113-14.
114. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 60 (2008); Borgmann, Judicial Deference, supra note 2, at 112-13. But
see Hill, supra note 104, at 321-22 (suggesting that in its analysis under the "effects" prong,
although the Court took "a substantially more deferential approach ... to Congress's findings
than it had taken to Nebraska's view of medical facts in Carhart I," the Court left the door open
to discrete, as-applied challenges that might entail closer scrutiny of the relevant medical facts).
115. Hill, supra note 104, at 319.
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which had treated medical emergency exceptions as a sine qua non of all
pre-viability abortion regulation.
16
The Court showed great hostility to the full pre-enforcement nature of
plaintiffs' challenge, admonishing that the lower courts should have never
have "entertained" the challenges.' 17 At the same time, although the Court
concluded that what it deemed "medical uncertainty" over the banned
methods' relative safety did not merit full pre-enforcement relief," 8 it
implied that a later challenge might assert that such uncertainty rendered
the Act unconstitutional in certain medical circumstances:
The considerations we have discussed support our further
determination that these facial attacks should not have been
entertained in the first instance. In these circumstances the proper
means to consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge. The
Government has acknowledged that preenforcement, as-applied
challenges to the Act can be maintained. This is the proper manner
to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete
and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to
occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used. In
an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better
quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.'19
While the Court still apparently contemplated pre-enforcement
challenges, it did not explain how such a challenge would differ from the
challenges that were in fact brought or what different evidence might
emerge in such a challenge. 20 Indeed, plentiful evidence was introduced in
the challenges to the Act concerning the medical conditions under which
the ban might operate to harm women. 21 Nevertheless, the Court did not
follow its approach in Ayotte and remand for an injunction tailored to such
circumstances.
116. See id.; Borgmann, Abortion Rights, supra note 105, at 706-13; see also Stenberg v.
Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban in part
because of its lack of a health exception).
117. Carhart 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
118. Id. at 1637-38 ("The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health, given the
availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives." (emphasis
added)); Hill, supra note 104, at 322. But see Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1651-52 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); infra Part I1I.B (discussing false promise of later as-applied challenges).
119. Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
120. Id. at 1651-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); infra Part 111.1; Hill, supra note 104, at 323-
24.
121. Carhart 1, 127 S. Ct. at 1651-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Hill, supra note 104, at
323-24.
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The Court's decision a year later in Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party122 demonstrated similar hostility to
facial challenges. There, the Supreme Court upheld Washington State's
blanket primary system against a full, preinforcement challenge. The law
provided that candidates for office would be identified on the primary
ballot by their self-designated "party preference," and that the top two vote-
getters, regardless of their party preference, would advance to the general
election. 23 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had fully invalidated the
statute, holding that it severely burdened political parties' associational
rights and finding that the offending party-preference designations on the
ballot were not severable. 24 The Supreme Court's decision was 7-2, with
Justice Thomas writing for the majority. Chief Justice Roberts issued a
concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy,
dissented.
Exemplifying the typical confusion among the various uses of the
term "facial challenge," the majority seemed particularly concerned about
the pre-enforcement nature of the challenge, emphasizing that the case was
not brought "in the context of an actual election."'' 25 The Court stressed
that, "[i]n determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful
not to go beyond the statute's facial requirements and speculate about
'hypothetical' or 'imaginary' cases."' 126  And the Court pointed out that
Washington's state courts had not so far construed the law "in the context
of actual disputes arising from the electoral context.' 27 In stating the test
for facial challenges, the Court set forth the Salerno standard, and its
discussion vacillated between the two prevailing interpretations of Salerno.
In accordance with the traditional view,' 28 the Court characterized the
Salerno test as focused on the constitutional versus unconstitutional sweep
(or applications) of the statute. 29  Yet in emphasizing that the statute
122. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
123. Id. at 1187.
124. Id. at 1190 (summarizing Ninth Circuit's decision).
125. Id.; see also id. at 1194-95 ("Because respondents brought their suit as a facial
challenge, we have no evidentiary record against which to assess their assertions that voters will
be confused.").
126. Id. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
127. Id. The Court also noted that the state courts had not had an opportunity to decide
whether to accord the law a narrowing construction. Id.
128. See supra Part I.B.
129. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190. The Court noted that the "no set of
circumstances" language in Salerno was controversial, but stated that "all agree that a facial
challenge must fail where the statute has a 'plainly legitimate sweep."' ld. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 & n.7
should be judged by its written terms, and not by reference to potential,
hypothetical applications, it also seemed to support Isserles's interpretation
of Salerno as referencing valid rule facial challenges.'
30
It is difficult to see how the Court's analysis could be squared with a
valid rule facial challenge, however, since the test the Court employed
necessarily depended upon an assessment of the extent of the statute's
predicted burden on speech. The test the Court applied first asks whether
the statute imposes a "severe burden on associational rights."' 31 If it does,
the statute is subjected to strict scrutiny. The Court found that the case
ultimately came down to a factual question regarding the first prong of the
test: whether the law would result in voter confusion and thereby severely
burden political parties' associational rights. 32  Underscoring its apparent
overriding concern with the case's pre-enforcement posture, the Court did
not consider the possibility of more limited relief. The Court found there
was nothing inherent in the law that burdened associational rights."'
Rather, any such burden must be assessed in the context of an actual
election, when the Court would have before it an evidentiary record against
which to evaluate the extent of any voter confusion. 34 The Court seemed
to acknowledge that certain ways of drafting a ballot might be clearer than
others in dispelling the impression of party endorsement. 135 It then cited
two cases in which the Court considered limiting constructions:
136 Ayotte 37
and Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 138 Yet here, the Court did not remand
for the lower court to consider (or certify to the state's highest court to
consider) such a possible limiting construction. Instead, it chose to uphold
(1997)). The Court then stated that "Washington's primary system survives under either
standard." Id.
130. Id.; see supra Part I.B.
131. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1191.
132. Id. at 1192.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1193-94. When the Ninth Circuit held Washington's earlier system
unconstitutional, it specifically held that the facial nature of the challenge meant that the plaintiffs
need not produce evidence of actual harm:
This is a facial challenge to a statute burdening the exercise of a First Amendment right
.... In Jones, the Court read the state blanket primary statutes, determined that on their
face they restrict free association, accordingly subjected them to strict scrutiny, and
only then looked at the evidence to determine whether the State satisfied its burden of
showing narrow tailoring toward a compelling state interest.
Democratic Party of Wash. v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1213 (2004) (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)).
135. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1194.
136. Id.
137. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).
138. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794-96 (1989).
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the statute on its face and wait for a showing of actual harm. 139 Moreover it
implied that the extent of the harm would have to be substantial, finding
that "without the specter of widespread voter confusion, respondents'
arguments about forced association and compelled speech fall flat.'
40
Having rejected plaintiffs' assertions of threatened harm and therefore
the existence of any "severe burden" on their associational rights, the Court
found the state's justificatory burden to be commensurately lower. Rather
than assert a compelling interest, the state needed only to "assert" an
interest in "providing voters with relevant information about the
candidates. 14' The Court required no factual evidence whatsoever that
such information would in any way in meaningfully inform and educate the
public about the candidates, or even evidence as to whether the prior
system had left voters insufficiently informed. Thus, while speculation
about the facts was fatal to plaintiffs' claim, it was perfectly acceptable for
the state.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, would have found a severe burden
without requiring any post-enforcement evidence. He argued that the
plaintiffs were not obligated to produce evidence of distortion of their
message, what he pronounced a "perhaps-impossible task," but rather the
Court must "accept [claimants'] own assessments of the matter."'' 42 And he
maintained that the state had not shown that this burden was narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling interest. In fact, Scalia was suspicious of the
government's stated motive of informing voters, claiming that there was
"no mystery what is going on here," namely, "the Washington
Legislature's dislike for bright-colors partisanship"'143 and its desire to
"reduce the effectiveness of political parties.'"
Scalia's conclusion seemed wholly at odds with the Salerno test as
commonly understood. Scalia seemed to struggle to explain how the
statute could impose a severe burden in every conceivable application.
Thus, he simply asserted that the associational harms "will be present no
matter how [the] law is implemented." Therefore, he concluded, there was
"no good reason to wait" for an actual election. 45 This seems implausible;
139. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
140. Id. at 1194 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1195.
142. Id. at 1201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1202 (noting that "[i]t does not take a
study to establish" that the ballot requirement will affect voter perception).
143. Id. at 1202.
144. Id. at 1198.
145. Id. at 1200.
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both the majority opinion 146 and Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence
47
found that ballots could be designed to avoid associational burdens.
Moreover, it is possible that in some elections the candidates who qualified
for the general election would be the parties' standard bearers and thus
their endorsement would neither burden the parties' associational rights nor
mislead the public. Despite his outward focus on the traditional Salerno
test, aspects of Scalia's analysis evoked the valid rule interpretation of
Salerno offered by Marc Isserles. It seems likely that Scalia, suspicious of
the state's professed reasons for the law, saw the entire system as poisoned
by the illegitimate purpose of burdening political parties' participation in
elections. 1
48
The Court's 2008 decision in Baze v. Rees 149 offers yet another
example of the Roberts Court's favored approach to facial and as-applied
challenges. In Baze, Plaintiffs sought full invalidation of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections' written protocol implementing the state's
statute requiring executions by lethal injection. 150  The protocol had been
administered once before with "no reported problems," and the plaintiffs,
death row inmates in Kentucky, awaited sentencing under the protocol. 151
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, did not directly address
the "facial" nature of the case. The Court simply denied the requested
relief, concluding that "petitioners have not carried their burden of showing
that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal
injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives,
constitute cruel and unusual punishment."' 52 Like in Washington State
Grange, the Court seemed troubled by the hypothetical nature of the
alleged harm (risk of a painful execution). It noted that any hypothetical
scenario would have to be egregious to justify invalidation. 53 Here, Chief
Justice Roberts found, the risk of harm was speculative and insufficiently
146. Id. at 1194 (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
148. See id. at 1198, 1202 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Isserles, supra note 31, at 440.
149. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
150. The Kentucky penal law mandates generally that every death sentence be executed by
lethal injection. Id. at 1527-28 (plurality opinion) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(l)(a)
(West 2006)). The state Department of Corrections established a written protocol for how lethal
injections are administered in Kentucky. Id. at 1528.
151. Id. at 1528-29.
152. Id. at 1526.
153. Id. at 1531 (noting that "'a hypothetical situation' involving 'a series of abortive
attempts at electrocution' would present a different case," and that, "[i]n terms of our present
Eighth Amendment analysis, such a situation-unlike an 'innocent misadventure,'-would
demonstrate an 'objectively intolerable risk of harm' that officials may not ignore" (citations
omitted)).
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significant in magnitude. 154 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that plaintiffs
had not met their burden of demonstrating an "objectively intolerable" risk
that Kentucky's three-drug protocol would be maladministered, thereby
causing "wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth Amendment."'
' 55
As skeptical as it was of the factual basis establishing risk of harm, the
plurality did not question the state's purpose in adhering to the challenged
protocol. 56 The Court found that scrutiny of the state's chosen method
"would embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their
expertise, and would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in
implementing their execution procedures."'157 Instead, it was plaintiffs'
burden to come forward with evidence that "the alternative procedure [is]
feasible, readily implemented, and [would] in fact significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain."' 158 Only at that point would the burden shift
to the state to show "a legitimate penological justification for adhering to
its current method of execution."'
59
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, disagreed that respect for
legislative discretion warranted judicial deference to the state's chosen
protocol. Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Stevens noted that neither
legislative nor administrative processes were likely to produce unbiased
findings about how best to ensure "humane" and painless executions:
In the majority of States that use the three-drug protocol, the drugs
were selected by unelected Department of Correction officials with
no specialized medical knowledge and without the benefit of expert
assistance or guidance. As such, their drug selections are not entitled
to the kind of deference afforded legislative decisions.
Nor should the failure of other state legislatures, or of Congress, to
outlaw the use of the drug on condemned prisoners be viewed as a
nationwide endorsement of an unnecessarily dangerous practice.
Even in those States where the legislature specifically approved the
use of a paralytic agent, review of the decisions that led to the
adoption of the three-drug protocol has persuaded me that they are
the product of "'administrative convenience' and a "stereotyped
reaction" to an issue, rather than a careful analysis of relevant
considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion....
154. See id.; see also infra Part III.A (discussing Roberts Court's preference for showing of
actual harm).
155. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537-38.
156. See id. at 1530 (noting that "[tihis Court has never invalidated a State's chosen pro-
cedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment").
157. Id. at 1531.
158. Id. at 1532.
159. Id.
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[I am] persuaded... that current decisions by state legislatures, by the
Congress of the United States, and by this Court to retain the death
penalty as a part of our law are the product of habit and inattention
rather than an acceptable deliberative process that weighs the costs
and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable
benefits, and rest in part on a faulty assumption about the retributive
force of the death penalty. 1
60
Nevertheless, Stevens concluded that under the Court's precedents the
plaintiffs had not met their burden to prove that Kentucky's method of
execution was "cruel and unusual."' 6' Justice Ginsburg, however, "would
not [have] dispose[d] of the case so swiftly given the character of the risk at
stake."'1 62  Ginsburg would have vacated and remanded for consideration
whether Kentucky's omission of certain safeguards posed "an untoward,
readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain."'
163
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,'64 also decided in 2008,
was brought as a full, pre-enforcement challenge to an Indiana law that
requires voters to show government-issued photo identification when
voting in person.165 The law's stated purpose was to prevent voter fraud,
166
improve and modernize election procedures, and safeguard voter
confidence. 167 Again, the Roberts Court rebuffed the plaintiffs' "facial"
challenge in part because of their failure to show actual harm. Although
noting the "importance" of the case, the plurality was "persuaded that the
District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the
validity of the entire statute."
1 68
160. Id. at 1545-46 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
161. Id. at 1552.
162. Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S& Ct. 1610 (2008).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1617 (plurality opinion); see also Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note
2, at 53-55 (discussing the Court's deference to legislative fact-finding in Crawford despite thin
factual basis for law); Press Release, Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita, Rokita Applauds
Passage of Photo Identification Bill and Absentee Ballot Reform, available at
http://www.in.gov/sos/press/2005/04122005b.html (declaring that law was "aimed at preserving
voter confidence and promoting integrity in elections"). At both the trial and appellate levels, the
courts simply assumed that voter fraud among in-person voters was an actual problem in Indiana.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), affg Ind. Democratic
Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), reh "g denied, 484 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2007).
167. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617.
168. Id. at 1615.
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The substantive standard the Court applied in Crawford was a
balancing test that weighed "the asserted injury to the right to vote against
the 'precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule." ' 169 Yet, as in previous facial challenge cases,
the Court looked skeptically at plaintiffs' claims of burden while accepting
uncritically the factual basis for the asserted state justifications. In fact, the
Court admitted that "[t]he record contains no evidence of any such fraud
actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history."'
' 70
Justice Souter, dissenting, recognized the importance of ascertaining a
factual basis for the admittedly valid, but here abstract, state interest in
preventing voter fraud. 171 He contended that Indiana's stated interest in
preventing voter fraud must "be discounted for the fact that the State has
not come across a single instance of in-person voter impersonation fraud in
all of Indiana's history."'172  Souter agreed with the majority that courts
should give some deference to legislative empirical judgments. "But," he
cautioned, "the ultimate valuation of the particular interest a State asserts
has to take account of evidence against it as well as legislative judgments
for it.' 73 Given the lack of factual support for its voter fraud justification,
Souter observed that the justification smacked of pretext for a law designed
to burden a particular class of voters likely to vote Democratic: "[T]he onus
of the Indiana law is illegitimate just because it correlates with no state
interest so well as it does with the object of deterring poorer residents from
exercising the franchise."'
74
Unlike in Baze, the Court in Crawford expressly addressed the facial
nature of plaintiffs' challenge. Relying on Washington State Grange, the
Court characterized plaintiffs' approach as one of overbreadth, seeking full
invalidation without claiming that the statute will operate unconstitutionally in
169. Id. at 1616 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
170. Id. at 1619.
171. See id. at 1628, 1636 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is no denying the abstract
importance, the compelling nature, of combating voter fraud. But it takes several steps to get
beyond the level of abstraction here." (citations omitted)).
172. Id. at 1637.
173. Id. at 1639.
174. Id. at 1643; see also id. at 1639 n.32 ("On such flimsy evidence of fraud, it would also
ignore the lessons of history to grant the State's interest more than modest weight, as the interest
in combating voter fraud has too often served as a cover for unnecessarily restrictive electoral
rules."); id. at 1624 & n.21 (noting that all Republican legislators voted for the law and all present
Democratic legislators voted against it); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949,
954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting) ("Let's not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter
photo ID law is a not-too-thinly veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain
folks believed to skew Democratic.").
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all its applications. 75 Yet, although it spoke in terms of "applications," the
plurality did not apply the traditional Salerno standard. Instead, it stated
that "[a] facial challenge must fail where the statute has a 'plainly
legitimate sweep."' 17 6  The plurality concluded that the alleged burdens
were too hypothetical and applied only to "a small number of voters who
may experience a special burden under the statute."' 177  Despite the pre-
enforcement nature of the challenge, the Court again expressed a
preference for a showing of actual harm. It stated that, in the absence of
"concrete evidence of the burden imposed on voters who currently lack
photo identification," it could not conclude that the statute posed excessive
burdens on voters.' 78 Finally, in rejecting the plaintiffs' request for full
invalidation, the Court cited Ayotte, stating that narrower remedies are
preferred whenever possible. Yet the Court did not remand for
consideration of more limited relief.
C. Significance of Roberts Court's Rulings on Facial Challenges
While the Roberts Court has already rebuffed several full pre-
enforcement challenges to laws that threaten individual rights, it is not yet
clear whether the Court is pursuing a purposeful, overarching strategy
regarding facial and as-applied challenges. Several of the Court's opinions
on facial invalidation have been either fractured or sharply divided,'79 and
the remainder follow no obvious pattern in terms of authorship or Justices
in the majority. 18  As scholars have observed, the Court has long lacked a
coherent, principled approach to facial and as-applied challenges, instead
appearing to reach outcome-driven decisions that mainly reflect the extent
of the majority's sympathy either for the underlying legislation or the rights
175. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (plurality opinion); see also supra Part I.B (discussing
"overbreadth" facial challenges).
176. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190(2008)).
177. Id. at 1622.
178. Id. at 1622-23.
179. See id. at 1612 (Justice Stevens announced judgment and wrote plurality opinion;
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas concurred; Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented);
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (Chief Justice Roberts wrote plurality; Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer each concurred; Justices Ginsburg and Souter dissented); Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (5-4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, with
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dissenting).
180. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008) (7-2
decision written by Justice Thomas; Chief Justice Roberts concurred; Justices Scalia and
Kennedy dissented); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006)
(unanimous decision written by Justice O'Connor).
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being infringed.' 8' The Roberts Court may simply be continuing this
muddled line of Supreme Court precedent on facial challenges.
Moreover, the Roberts Court has heralded a rightward ideological
shift on the bench, from a split in which Justice O'Connor served as the
swing vote and Justice Kennedy was counted in the conservative half, to
one in which a solidly conservative four face off against the four more
liberal Justices, with Justice Kennedy functioning as the swing vote.
Decisions like Carhart II suggest less a principled opposition to facial
challenges than a new permissiveness toward legislative restrictions on
certain kinds of rights. And some of the rejections to facial challenges in
which the liberal Justices have participated may simply represent those
Justices' pragmatic attempts to cut their losses and head off a more extreme
decision, by joining an opinion that denies full invalidation while leaving
open the possibility of more limited relief in the future. 82 Moreover, in
cases involving rights to which the conservative Justices are more
sympathetic, the Roberts Court has not hesitated to issue straightforwardly
"facial" relief. 1
83
But if the Roberts Court's hostility to facial challenges is genuine, it is
worth considering what might be fueling that hostility. At least two
principles may drive the Court's rejection of facial invalidations: (1) A
belief that complete invalidation is a drastic remedy that should not be
granted absent a showing of actual harm, and (2) a belief in the importance
of concrete facts in adjudication. As discussed in Part III, however, the
Court has not demonstrated consistent, true commitment to either of these
principles. More likely, the Court is unsympathetic to the underlying rights
claimed in the cases. Requiring actual harm can be used to impose a
barrier to litigation in such contexts. And where the Court is not
sympathetic to the rights involved, risking infringement of those rights by
denying pre-enforcement relief might not seem so troubling to the Court.
Similarly, the Court's apparent interest in concrete facts is illusory. While
the Court has looked skeptically at plaintiffs' evidence of harm, it has
shown a willingness to defer to a legislature's view of the facts
necessitating rights-infringing laws.
Part IV argues that the Roberts Court's priorities when addressing
rights-infringing laws have been the reverse of what constitutional norms
181. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 879-80.
182. See, e.g., Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Justice Stevens wrote the controlling opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy); Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320.
183. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770, 2775 (2008) (invalidating "Millionaire's
Amendment" to BCRA in context of "facial challenge"); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2818-19, 2821-22 (2008) (invalidating prohibition on handgun possession in the home
and declining to issue more limited ruling).
demand. Since the courts have a duty to protect important controversial
and minority constitutional rights from majoritarian control, they should
look skeptically and independently at a legislature's proffered factual
grounds for laws that infringe these rights. Where an adequate factual basis
is lacking, the shortcoming infects the entire law in a way that makes full
pre-enforcement invalidation appropriate.
II. Problems with the Preference for As-Applied Challenges
A. Actual Versus Threatened Harm
In several of its recent decisions, including Washington State Grange,
Crawford, and Baze, the Roberts Court has denied facial invalidations in
part because the pre-enforcement nature of the challenge meant that
plaintiffs had produced no evidence of actual harm. Does this mean that
the Court will now more regularly require such evidence before it will fully
(or even partially) invalidate a statute?
In Washington State Grange, the Court stressed that a failure to show
actual harm doomed the plaintiffs' case.184 Yet the Court was unable to
explain why it had previously accepted very similar predictions-rather
than actual proof-of harm in First Amendment cases. 185 It had even done
so in the context of case-specific, post-enforcement challenges, where
proof of actual harm might more readily be expected. In Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,186 New Jersey's public accommodations law had been
applied to forbid the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA") to revoke a gay
man's position as assistant scoutmaster. The Court held that this
application of the law violated BSA's freedom of expressive association by
threatening to distort its intended messages. 187  The Washington State
Grange opinion attempted to distinguish Dale on the ground that in Dale
the required "association" was actual, not merely an appearance of
association.'88 Yet the harm, just as in Washington State Grange, was
hypothetical. In Dale, the Court did not require BSA to submit any
evidence that its message was affected by the application of New Jersey's
public accommodations law against it. Instead, the Court deferred to
plaintiffs' allegations of harm, noting, "As we give deference to an
association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also
184. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
185. Id. at 1194 n.9 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)).
186. Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
187. Id. at 654-56.
188. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1194 n.9.
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give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression."1
89
Chief Justice Roberts readily accepted the asserted threatened harm in
Dale while finding the associational burden in Washington State Grange
too speculative. In his concurring opinion in the latter case, he remarked
that accepting a gay scoutmaster into the Boy Scouts "would lead outsiders
to believe the Scouts endorsed homosexual conduct."' 90  He was even
satisfied with the notion, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,191 that requiring organizers of a St.
Patrick's Day Parade to include a pro-gay-rights float "might create the
impression that the organizers agreed with the float-sponsors' message."'1
92
Yet, when it came to the Washington state ballots, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the potential harm was too speculative, since "we have no idea
what those ballots will look like."' 93
In Crawford and Baze, the Court again claimed that full invalidation
was inappropriate in the absence of a showing of actual harm. In Baze, the
Court seemed to deny the need to show actual harm in the death penalty
context, but required something nearly indistinguishable from actual harm.
The plurality wrote,
Our cases recognize that subjecting individuals to a risk of future
harm-not simply actually inflicting pain-can qualify as cruel and
unusual punishment. To establish that such exposure violates the
Eighth Amendment, however, the conditions presenting the risk must
be "sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering," and give rise to "sufficiently imminent dangers."'
194
189. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653; see also id, at 677-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing
skepticism about burden on Boy Scouts' expressive activities and noting organization's failure to
establish how presence of gay members would affect those activities).
190. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1196 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
191. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
575-77 (1995).
192. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1196 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Hurley, 515
U.S. at 577 (concluding without supporting evidence that, "[w]ithout deciding on the precise
significance of the likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of
an expressive parade . . . the parade's overall message is distilled from the individual
presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the
whole.").
193. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
194. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-31 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993)).
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Because there was no evidence of any botched executions in Kentucky,' 95
the Court found that full invalidation of Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol was unwarranted. 196 Likewise, in Crawford, the Court faulted the
plaintiffs for producing no "concrete evidence" of cases in which voters
who lacked the requisite identification would either be unable to procure it
or could not take the steps necessary to vote by provisional ballot.'
97
Requiring evidence of actual harm in a challenge to a rights-infringing
law defeats the very purpose of a pre-enforcement challenge; indeed, it
arguably makes a pre-enforcement challenge impossible. While one can
imagine circumstances in which the Court might accept evidence of harm
from analogous contexts-for example, other jurisdictions that had
implemented similar laws-the Roberts Court has seemed unwilling to
entertain such evidence. In Baze, for example, the Court declined to
consider other states' experiences in administering lethal injection as
grounds for invalidating Kentucky's death penalty.' 98
Moreover, depending on the nature of the threatened harm, requiring
actual harm is morally troubling. It is one thing to allow harm before
considering a challenge in the context of an election, where for one election
some individuals may lose their right to vote or political parties'
associational rights may be burdened. 199 It is another to require harm in the
context of abortion or the death penalty. In Carhart II, the Court claimed
that "pre-enforcement, as-applied" challenges were still possible.2"0 But it
is not clear what the Court contemplated, especially since the Court had
before it sufficient evidence of particular medical circumstances warranting
the banned procedure. 20' Had the Court thought full invalidation was
inappropriate because the relief was disproportionately broad, it could have
granted more a limited injunction. Perhaps instead the Court envisioned a
woman in extremis and contemplated her doctor bringing an emergency
petition to allow use of the banned method. But this expectation is
195. The single execution to occur under the challenged protocol indicated no apparent
problems. Id. at 1528.
196. See id. at 1528, 1532-34.
197. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621-22 (2008) (plurality
opinion). But see Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 (accepting at face value a preference for handguns
over other weapons for purposes of home defense).
198. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528, 1530-31 (2008) (plurality opinion); id. at 1565 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
199. Of course, if the interference with rights in such circumstances rises to the level of
influencing the outcome of elections, the potential harm is much more significant, long-lasting,
and widespread, and it is commensurately more troubling to require evidence of that harm before
granting relief.
200. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638-39 (2007).
201. See id. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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intolerable and unworkable in a medical emergency situation. It is likewise
difficult, not to mention morally disturbing, to imagine a more limited
challenge to a death penalty protocol that would satisfy the Court. It seems
the Court would require evidence of an actual execution gone awry, or a
scientific and medical consensus of significant risk of botched executions
(presumably based on evidence of problems arising in actual executions).
B. The False Promise of Later As-Applied Challenges
In its facial rulings, the Roberts Court has been quick to assure
plaintiffs of the possibility of an as-applied challenge. In Washington State
Grange, the Court said that a "factual determination [of voter confusion]
must wait an as-applied challenge. '20 2 Ayotte seems to suggest that, when
confronting a facial challenge, the Court should issue partial invalidations
rather than full invalidations whenever possible. Yet, as it did in
Washington State Grange, what the Roberts Court has more often done is
simply deny the facial challenge completely. If the Court seems to
recognize that the law may be invalid in some of its applications, it
suggests that a future, as-applied challenge can be brought. This promise
of future as-applied challenges has generally proven to be a hollow one,
apparently serving more to help cobble together votes on the Court, or to
allow the Court to avoid explicitly overturning a precedent, than to provide
meaningful alternative relief to those affected by rights-infringing laws.
WRTL II suggests that later, as-applied challenges will either provide
only exceedingly limited protections for individual rights or, perhaps more
likely, serve as a disingenuous way of issuing a broader ruling. In WRTL
II, the plaintiff won its claim that its ads were unconstitutionally barred in a
2004 election, but only after the election had already passed. The Court
suggested its as-applied ruling reached only "materially similar ads" run by
WRTL.2 °3 If that were true, it is not clear how a fractured decision to grant
case-specific, post-enforcement relief would alleviate a chilling effect on
other speakers whose ads the law prohibits. Justice Scalia acknowledged
this problem, commenting, "McConnell was mistaken in its belief that as-
applied challenges could eliminate the unconstitutional applications of
section 203. They can do so only if a test is adopted which contradicts the
holding of McConnell.' 2 4
In fact, the test by which Chief Justice Roberts measured the WRTL
ads does seem to contradict McConnell. In a part of his opinion joined only
202. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008); see also
Carhartl 126 S. Ct. 1610; Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610.
203. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2663 (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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by Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts declared that "a court should find
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate. 2 °5 As David Franklin notes, given that
three other Justices stand prepared to strike the electioneering
communications provision down in its entirety, "WRTL II renders
McConnell a practical nullity by laying out a test under which every
realistically conceivable as-applied challenge to section 203 will succeed,
while at the same time purporting not to disturb the holding of
McConnell., 20 6  Thus, Franklin observes, WRTL H effectively issued a
"facial invalidation ... in as-applied clothing."
207
Even where the Court is prepared to issue more genuinely limited
relief, it is not clear why the Court should prefer to wait for later, as-
applied challenges in order to do so. Unless the Court is demanding
evidence of actual harm, there is no reason why the Court should wait to
issue a more limited ruling in many full, pre-enforcement challenges. The
plaintiff is seeking prospective relief; making the plaintiff wait defeats the
purpose of bringing the claim pre-enforcement. In Ayotte, had the Court
simply denied the challenge on the ground that the full facial invalidation
plaintiffs sought was inappropriate, the consequence would be that a future
challenge could be brought only when a teenager was facing an emergency.
Such a challenge would be both dangerous and impractical.2"' In fact, in
most cases, the Court has all the facts it needs to issue a narrower
remedy.20 9 Should the Court wish to grant more limited pre-enforcement
relief, the only question that must then be answered is the appropriateness
of severing the statute.210
The Court's stated preference for as-applied challenges seems
superficially to indicate a greater respect for an interest in facts.2 1' Yet
205. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion).
206. Franklin, supra note 67, at 706.
207. Id. This interpretation of WRTL II is bolstered by the Court's facial invalidation of
another provision of the BCRA. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2775 (invalidating "Millionaire's
Amendment" of BCRA). Indeed, after a recent oral argument in the Supreme Court addressing
yet another application of the BCRA, some are speculating that an outright facial invalidation of
the statute may be imminent. See Adam Liptak, Justices Seem Skeptical of Scope of Campaign
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009.
208. Brief of Respondents, supra note 23, at 30-32.
209. See supra Part III.A.
210. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2008).
211. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) ("By focusing on the factual
situation before us, and similar cases necessary for development of a constitutional rule, we face
'flesh-and-blood' legal problems with data 'relevant and adequate to an informed judgment."'
(footnotes omitted)).
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there are reasons to doubt this. First, the Court has given no direction on
what it wants when it suggests future, "as-applied" challenges. In
Washington State Grange, the Court indicated that voter confusion must be
212widespread in order to meet the applicable legal standard, yet it
otherwise provided no guidance on this issue. Chief Justice Roberts, in his
concurrence, would not require that the parties "produce studies regarding
voter perceptions," but he wanted to "see what the ballot says before
deciding whether it is unconstitutional. '2 13 Seeing an actual ballot might
lend more concreteness to a case in that particular context, but evidence of
harm would still be hypothetical, a notion to which the Roberts Court
generally seems hostile.
More importantly, far from demonstrating a real interest in facts, the
Court has often shown an active disinterest in facts and sound fact-finding.
Rather, its demand for facts is uneven and seemingly outcome-driven. The
Court appears to use a demand for facts as a hurdle to throw up when the
Court disfavors, or is unsympathetic to, the rights at issue. In Washington
State Grange, the majority sought concrete evidence of a burden on
associational rights through the actual design of a ballot and conduct of an
election, while Justice Scalia was conspicuously uninterested in evidence
of voter confusion or other burdens on plaintiffs' associational rights.
214
The majority seemed more sympathetic to the rights asserted in Dale,
agreeing with that decision21 5 although the plaintiff had produced no facts
demonstrating that its expressive activity was harmed.21 6
On the flip side, the Court has been notably solicitous of factual
conclusions relied on by legislatures. In Crawford, the legislature
purported to respond to a concern about voter fraud but produced no
evidence of voter fraud in the state.217 In Washington State Grange, the
Court required no evidence of a need for voter information that would
justify the particular primary system the legislation had established.21 8 And
in Carhart II, the Court credited dubious fact-finding by Congress in order
212. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1194.
213. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
214. Id. at 1201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1194 n.9 (majority opinion).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89 (discussing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000)).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 170-69 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)).
218. See supra text accompanying note 141 (discussing Wash, State Grange, 128 S. Ct. 1184
(2008)).
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to reach a finding of medical disagreement about the banned procedures.
21 9
As discussed in Part IV, a greater focus on legislative fact-finding in these
cases is especially important since the stated purposes for the laws often
seem pretextual. 220  The Court's recent stated preference for as-applied
challenges thus does not ensure that, where a facial challenge fails, future
case-specific litigation will provide meaningful alternative relief while
ensuring serious judicial examination of the relevant facts.
Moreover, the Court's preferred litigation posture is inconsistent with
how civil and constitutional rights have been litigated in the past and with
how the Court has decided such cases. The legal standards themselves
generally call for a broader examination of social facts. As such, once it
has satisfied itself that standing requirements are met, the Court has
generally not focused at all on the individual litigants before the Court.221
In Kennedy v. Louisiana,22 z for example, the Court addressed a challenge to
the imposition of the death penalty in cases of child rape. While the Court
recounted the case's horrific facts in detail,223 it then issued a general ruling
fully invalidating the statute,224 considering and relying on a wide range of
social facts without ever again revisiting the particular facts of the case
before it.225 And this is appropriate, since such challenges generally are
aimed at remedying a broader social problem a rights-infringing law
creates, not simply at obtaining relief in an individual case.226 Washington
State Grange, for example, seems less about actual voter confusion that
might be caused by a particular ballot than about the principle of forced
association and the extent of the Court's sympathy for the importance of
insuring meaningful participation by political parties in elections.
C. Problematic Cases for As-Applied Challenges
Part IV considers why constitutional norms weigh in favor of full pre-
enforcement invalidations in certain cases involving rights-infringing laws.
But there are also more pragmatic considerations that militate against
219. See supra text accompanying note 106 (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 1l), 127
S. Ct. 1610 (2007)).
220. See supra Part I1.B (discussing likelihood of pretextual motives in Carhart II, Wash.
State Grange, and Crawford).
221. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see generally David M. Driesen, Standing
for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004).
222. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
223. Id. at 2645-48.
224. See id. at 2646.
225, Id. at 2649-65.
226 See Savage, supra note 64 (quoting ACLU Legal Director Steve Shapiro).
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requiring as-applied challenges, or awarding only as-applied remedies,
when laws infringe on individual constitutional rights. Cases in which the
existence of a statute imposes a chilling effect-for example, where a
statute imposes criminal penalties and/or vaguely defines the boundaries of
permissible and prohibited behavior-are particularly ill-suited to as-
applied challenges. Accordingly, scholars as well as the Court have
acknowledged the special importance of full, pre-enforcement challenges in
certain individual rights contexts, such as vagueness and First Amendment
overbreadth. 227 While a particular individual may bring a case-specific,
pre-enforcement challenge in such a case, a remedy limited to that claimant
will leave the statute in force, and the chilling effect will remain as to other
claimants.228 This concern has typically been cited in the context of
overbreadth challenges, 229 but Marc Isserles argues that the concern is even
more acute in valid rule facial challenges:
Whereas the concern in overbreadth doctrine is that a broad statute
threatens to suppress third parties' speech in a substantial number of
applications (even though it is constitutionally valid in the case at
hand), the concern in a valid rule facial challenge is that, in any
individual application (including the one against the party before the
court), the constitutional flaw in the statute itself creates such a
likelihood of sup ression that the statute must be deemed invalid in
every application.
Cases in which confidentiality or other concerns are likely to prevent
concrete cases from coming before the courts, because individual, harmed
plaintiffs are reluctant to appear in court, also benefit from the availability
of facial challenges. Finally, fact patterns capable of repetition, yet
evading review, are classic cases that are ill-suited to case-specific
challenges, since it is impractical or even impossible to produce or
maintain a live, concrete case in such circumstances.
Abortion cases exemplify all of these characteristics, so it is no
surprise that historically litigation in these cases has proceeded through full
227. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (vagueness); Viii. of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffinan Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (First Amendment
overbreadth).
228. See Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984) ("Facial
challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for
the benefit of society-to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other
parties not before the court.").
229. See id.; cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 277-78 (arguing that overbreadth doctrine is
constitutionally mandated to avoid chilling effect); Fallon, supra note 11, at 873 (same).
230. Isserles, supra note 31, at 393 n.156.
pre-enforcement challenges. The acute need for confidentiality as well as
the fleeting nature of pregnancy pose practical barriers to partial or case-
specific pre-enforcement challenges by individual litigants. And success in
such challenges would do nothing to alleviate likely chilling effects and the
burdens imposed on other women and abortion providers subject to the
laws. Abortion cases concern laws that have a broad social impact that will
continue as long as the laws are in effect. It is a highly inefficient use of
judicial resources to require such laws to be addressed through piecemeal
litigation. If the Court wants to extricate itself from deciding abortion
cases,231 this is not the way to go about it. Moreover, piecemeal litigation
reduces the precedential value of Supreme Court decisions regarding laws
that infringe important rights, even where the Court rules favorably in a
given case.232 By insisting on case-specific challenges, the Court seems to
put the public on notice that each case is different and must be assessed
separately.233  This excuses the Court from providing predictability and
guidance as to the scope and contours of individual rights. Those affected
by rights-infringing laws lose the ability to exercise their constitutional
rights with confidence.234
IV. The Importance of Facial Challenges in Ensuring Legislative
Constitutional Accountability
While partial or case-specific pre- or post-enforcement challenges
may be appropriate in certain contexts, the Supreme Court should not force
litigants to rely solely on such challenges when laws threaten to infringe
important individual rights. Rather, the Court should stand ready to
invalidate laws completely where legislatures either ignore clear
constitutional rulings protecting individual rights or where they-whether
deliberately or recklessly-base statutes on a questionable factual
foundation. In doing so, the Court will fulfill its crucial role in protecting
basic individual rights, especially minority and unpopular rights, from
majoritarian power.
2 35
231. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do
neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining.").
232. See Faigman, supra note 58, at 646 ("In Casey and Carhart I, the national approach
served the strong jurisprudential value of ensuring consistent constitutional outcomes from state
to state.").
233. See id. at 637 (stating that "perhaps most importantly, resolutions of adjudicative facts
have limited import, since they typically bear upon only individual cases").
234. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 843 (joint opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence
of doubt.").
235. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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In Washington State Grange, the Court stated that facial invalidations
contravene the democratic process because they "prevent laws embodying
the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with
the Constitution., 236 Similarly, in Ayotte, the Court asserted that a facial
invalidation "frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the
people. '237 Yet this is not so if the statute represents legislative defiance of
clearly established constitutional precedent. It is not at all implausible that
a legislature might disagree with the Court's substantive interpretation of
the Constitution and want to make a point to the Court by flouting a
requirement such as a medical emergency requirement or health exception
in an abortion restriction. Anti-abortion-rights politicians, for example,
have often criticized the Supreme Court's requirement of a health
exception in abortion restrictions as an unmanageable loophole.238
Legislatures have periodically shown their disdain for the requirement by
proposing, and sometimes passing, legislation that lacks such an exception.
For instance, after the Supreme Court decided Carhart I, state legislatures
and Congress knew that a "partial-birth abortion" ban should contain a
health exception in order to pass constitutional muster.239 Yet, after the
decision, bans lacking such an exception continued to be passed at both the
state and federal levels. While the state bans as well as the federal ban
were facially invalidated at the Court of Appeals level consistent with
Carhart J,240 the Supreme Court ultimately rewarded Congress's defiance
236. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
237. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,652 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
238. In the final 2008 presidential debate, Senator John McCain stated: "Again... just again,
[an] example of the eloquence of Senator Obama. He's health [indicates scare quotes] for the
mother. You know, that's been stretched by the pro-abortion movement in America to mean
almost anything. That's the extreme pro-abortion position, quote, 'health."' Transcript of the
Third McCain-Obama Presidential Debate, October 15, 2008 (Commission on Presidential
Debates), available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2008d.html; see also Jason Linkins,
McCain Mockingly Suggests That Concerns for a Mother's Health Are Extreme, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/15/mccain-mockingly-suggests
n_135072.html.
239. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1185 (9th
Cir. 2006) ("Congress did not inadvertently omit a health exception from the Act. It was not only
fully aware of Stenberg's holding that a statute regulating 'partial-birth abortion' requires a
health exception, but it adopted the Act in a deliberate effort to persuade the Court to reverse that
part of its decision."), rev'd Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Borgmann,
Abortion Rights, supra note 105, at 706-13 (discussing how Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530
U.S. 914 (2000), reaffirmed that health exception in abortion legislation was an independent
requirement under the U.S. Constitution).
240. See, e.g., Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 394 F. Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(Michigan ban), aff'd, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks,
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by upholding the federal ban in Carhart H in spite of this clear
constitutional flaw.14  Moreover, the Court did so without openly
overturning the health exception requirement. Instead, it put the burden of
trimming the law to appropriate constitutional limits on hypothetical
plaintiffs in hypothetical, future "as-applied" challenges.242
Legislatures have motivations besides outright defiance for passing
unconstitutional laws. Some legislation is based on hostility to a minority
group or to controversial rights,2 43 hostility so strong that it may overcome
regard for constitutional precedent. Sometimes legislatures pass clearly
unconstitutional legislation not to defy the Court so much as to bow to
constituent or lobbyists' concerns. They may reason that they can do so
without risk since the statute can always be challenged if unconstitutional.244
But whatever the motivation for such laws, if courts stand ready to repair
any constitutional defects in a statute, they in essence reward legislatures
for their disregard of constitutional requirements. As the Court itself has
repeatedly recognized, "[W]e are wary of legislatures who would rely on
our intervention, for '[i]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to
the courts to step inside' to announce to whom the statute may be
applied., 245 By being overly deferential to the legislative process in these
cases, the Court has struck the balance in the wrong way, allowing
legislatures to risk harming individuals by freely curbing their rights.
In contrast, "facial challenges" offer a way of encouraging legislative
constitutional accountability. 246  A legislature that disagrees with or
disdains the Court's interpretation of the Constitution may express its
disagreement by enacting a law that blatantly disregards the Court's
301 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2004) (Virginia ban), affd, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005), petition
for reh 'g denied, 422 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2005); cases cited supra note 95 (federal ban).
241. Carhart I, 127 S. Ct. at 1633, 1635-38.
242. Id. at 1638-39.
243. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Borgmann, Legislative Fact-
Finding, supra note 2, at 21-35 (providing case studies of such laws in the contexts of "partial-
birth abortion," sexual orientation and parenting, and "indecency" on the intemet); Isserles, supra
note 36, at 441 & n.371 (discussing Romer and other cases).
244. See Digital Media Wire Daily, supra note 27.
245. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (quoting United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)).
246. See Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2562; see generally Borgmann, Legislative Fact-
Finding, supra note 2; Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance, supra note 3; John 0. McGinnis &
Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law: The Courts Versus Congress in Social Fact-
Finding, CONST. COMMENTARY 69, 111-12 nn.182-85 (2008), available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1061502.
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rulings.247 Of course, the legislature then runs the likely risk that its law
will be only a symbolic gesture and will be quickly invalidated. On the
other hand, it may reach the Court at the right historical juncture to result in
a substantive legal change. There is nothing inherently troubling about-
indeed, there may well be value in-this kind of constitutional dialogue
between the legislative and judicial branches. But if the Court is not ready
to overrule a past precedent outright, it should not hesitate to rebuff the
legislature's attempt with full invalidation. Failure to do so encourages
legislatures to challenge Supreme Court constitutional precedent in more
disingenuous and insidious ways.
A recent Eighth Circuit en banc decision exemplifies how a court's
rejection of a facial challenge may sanction disingenuous legislative "fact-
finding" and abet legislative encroachments on individual rights. In
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, the plaintiffs challenged a South Dakota
law that requires physicians to deliver a government homily to patients
seeking an abortion. This written statement must include the following
assertions:
That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being; . .. [t]hat the pregnant woman has an existing
relationship with that unborn human being and that the relationship
enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and under the
laws of South Dakota; . . . [and] [t]hat by having an abortion, her
existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with
regards to that relationship will be terminated.
2 48
The law was premised upon the findings of a task force established by the
South Dakota legislature to help support efforts to restrict and even ban
abortion.249 The composition and methods of the task force were highly
controversial, outcome-driven, and politically motivated.25°
247. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1185 n.26
("We are here because the Supreme Court defended the indefensible [in Stenberg] .... We have
responded to the Supreme Court. I hope the Justices read this Record because I am talking to
you.... [T]here is no reason for a health exception." (quoting 149 CONG. REc. S3486 (daily ed.
Mar. 11, 2003) ( statement of Sen. Santorum))).
248. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)-(d) (2005). The statute further requires that,
if a patient seeks an explanation of any of the required disclosures, "or asks any other question
about a matter of significance to her," the physician must provide her a written answer which
"shall be made part of the permanent medical record of the patient." Id. § 34-23A- 10.1(1)(g).
249. See Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2, at 115, 123-29; Robert Post, David C.
Baum Memorial Lecture: Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 966-67; Reva B. Siegel, The Right's
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument,
57 DUKEL.J. 101, 103-04, 111-16(2008).
The district court preliminarily enjoined the statute on the grounds that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the requirement
violated the First Amendment rights of physicians to be free from
compulsion to speak.251 A panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 2  On
reconsideration by the en banc court, the Eighth Circuit reversed, relying in
part on the standard for a preliminary injunction as grounds for according
significant deference to the South Dakota legislature:
Only in a case such as this one, where a preliminary injunction is
sought to enjoin the implementation of a duly enacted state statute,
must district courts make a threshold finding that a party is likely to
prevail on the merits. By re-emphasizing this more rigorous standard
for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits in these
cases, we hope to ensure that preliminary injunctions that thwart a
state's presumptively reasonable democratic processes are
pronounced only after an appropriately deferential analysis.
253
Applying this deferential approach, the court discounted plaintiffs'
evidence regarding the provision's predicted unconstitutional effects,
noting, "Planned Parenthood's evidence and argument rely on the
supposition that, in practice, the patient will not receive or understand the
narrow, species-based definition of 'human being' in § 8(4) of the Act, but
we are not persuaded that this is so.,, 254 The court quoted the Supreme
Court's admonition in Washington State Grange that courts "must be
careful not to go beyond the statute's facial requirements and speculate
about 'hypothetical' or 'imaginary' cases. 255
At the same time, taking its cue from the Supreme Court, the court
was more than ready to defer to the legislature's assertion that the required
statements consisted of scientific fact, not moral judgment, which women
needed in order to make a well-informed decision about abortion 6.25  This
250. See Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2, at 123-29; Post, supra note 249, at 966-
68; Siegel, supra note 249, at 111-16.
251. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D. 2005).
252. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006).
253. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732-33 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 735.
255. Id. (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190
(2008)).
256. See id. at 728, 735. The court also found support in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I), 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), where the Court concluded that women
must suffer psychological harm following an abortion although the Court admitted it could "find
no reliable data" to support the proposition. See Planned Parenthood Minn., 530 F.3d at 734-35;
see also Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
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general posture of deference echoes the Supreme Court's approach in cases
like Crawford, where the Court deferred completely to the legislature's
asserted purpose in passing the law, even where that purpose rested upon a
dubious factual foundation. Moreover, in Carhart II, the Court had
specifically credited an alleged link between abortion and mental health,
even though the government did not rely on this claim and despite the
Court's own acknowledgement that the assertion has no basis in science.257
Indeed, it appears the Court in Carhart II was implicitly inviting lower
courts to defer to this claim when confronting abortion "informed consent"
laws (to which, unlike the abortion procedure ban at issue in Carhart II, the
assertion is far more relevant).
The Eighth Circuit's deference to the South Dakota legislature's fact-
finding in Rounds precluded it from facially invalidating the statute. Had
the Court taken the approach of Justice Scalia's dissent in Washington State
Grange, it would have credited the plaintiffs' claim of harm.258 More
importantly, it would have viewed with skepticism the government's
professed motivation of informing women about scientific facts regarding
pregnancy. Instead, the court's decision ensured that the case would
continue, perhaps even, as one of the law's supporters put it, to "a trial on
the humanity of the child." '259 Yet the South Dakota ban was motivated not
by solid evidence of a link between abortion and mental trauma, nor by a
desire to impart scientific information to women, but as part of a broader
agenda to ban abortion.260 The information requirement was designed as a
step on the path to overturning Roe v. Wade incrementally through lesser
261restrictions. Women and their doctors are now saddled with intrusive,
non-medical interference in the doctor-patient dialogue based on pretextual,
scientifically dubious asserted state purposes. And, rather than being
nipped in the bud through facial invalidation, the trend was encouraged by
the Supreme Court's deferential approach.262
257. See supra Part II.B (discussing Carhart II).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1197-1203 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
259. Letter from Samuel B. Casey & Harold J. Cassidy to Members of the South Dakota Pro-
Life Leadership Coalition at 7-8, 13 (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with author).
260. See id.
261. See id.; Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2, at 120-21; Siegel, supra note 249, at
1644-47.
262. See Borgmann, Judicial Evasion, supra note 2, at 114.
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Scholars have generally agreed that an improper purpose pervades an
entire law and makes full invalidation appropriate.263  Isserles has
suggested that the "purpose" prong of Casey's undue burden standard
might allow full invalidations of some abortion laws under the valid rule
interpretation of Salerno:
The purpose prong of this doctrinal test provides the basis for
successful valid rule facial challenges under Salerno and the analysis
provided above. If a facial challenger can demonstrate that a
particular statute was enacted with the purpose of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, the
constitutional infirmity will be unrelated to any defect arising from
particular statutory applications, and a court may properly conclude
that "no set of circumstances" exists in which the statute may be
constitutionally applied. All other things being equal, Casey's
purpose prong should support successful valid rule facial challenges
in a manner similar to purpose tests in other constitutional
contexts. a6
Identifying improper purposes in other contexts might help to justify
facial invalidations in those contexts as well. But while a greater focus on
the legislative purposes underlying rights-infringing laws is a good idea,
how to go about achieving this focus is a harder question. There are
several difficulties with simply strengthening a purpose requirement. First,
265onit is not clear how a court can determine legislative intent. How does one
establish legislative intent when a statute represents the vote of many
263. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 10, at 279; Fallon, supra note 11, at 1338, 1345; Isserles,
supra note 31, at 549. But see Metzger, supra note 13, at 917-19 & n.210 (noting that the Court
does not fully invalidate districting schemes, despite finding of unconstitutional purpose, in racial
redistricting cases).
264. Isserles, supra note 3 1, at 459 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, After Ayotte, supra
note 3, at 2573 (arguing for a revived use of the undue burden standard's purpose prong to help
"restore the legislative incentive to be a good faith partner in articulating abortion rights").
265. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute is . . . almost always an
impossible task. The number of possible motivations ... is not ... even finite .... To look for
the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist."); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (declining to invalidate
abortion statute under Casey's "purpose" prong in absence of evidence that legislature's
"predominant motive" was to create "substantial obstacle" to abortion); Richard H. Fallon, The
Supreme Court 1996 Term: Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54,
71-73 (1997) (describing difficulties in judicial implementation of purpose tests); see generally
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989). But see
Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 322-23 (arguing that "it is not particularly difficult to make
reasonable judgments about the motivations behind legislation in most cases").
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individuals? Even assuming a detailed legislative history exists, 266 what
evidence suffices to establish legislative intent: The assertions of a bill's
sponsors during floor debate? The assertions of other legislators? The
testimony of witnesses in legislative committee hearings? A committee's
report?
The partial-birth abortion context demonstrates the difficulty of
pinpointing a legislature's purpose in enacting a law. The ban was
originally conceived (by an anti-abortion-rights activist and a
Congressman) as a political tool to help win "hearts and minds" on the
issue of abortion.267 The model ban's authors believed that, by forcing pro-
choice advocates to talk about the abortion procedure, the bans would open
the public's eyes to the gruesomeness of abortion.268  Thus, partial-birth
abortion, in the drafters' eyes, would pave the way for an ultimate outright
ban on abortion.269 Yet it is quite possible, and even likely, that many
legislators who considered the bans were not fully aware of this hidden
agenda. In fact, the public relations campaign surrounding partial-birth
abortion was so successful that the term-which has no medical meaning-
became common usage in the national political dialogue. Even many
ordinarily pro-choice legislators voted for the bans270 because they believed
the rhetoric that the bans addressed a rogue, especially grisly, unnecessary,
and even dangerous procedure.
Moreover, assuming legislative purpose could be clearly ascertained,
simply demanding a legitimate purpose, without more, will make it too
easy for a legislature to defend a rights-infringing law by presenting a
pretextual purpose. 271 As the Supreme Court has observed,
266. Many state legislatures do not keep such detailed records.
267. See Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have
Everything To Lose, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1, 2004, at 33; Nadine Strossen & Caitlin Borgmann,
The Carefully Orchestrated Campaign, 3 NEXUS 3, 5-6 (1998); see also Brief for NARAL
Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530
U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (discussing role of National Right to Life Committee in crafting
ban).
268. See Gorney, supra note 267, at 6-7, 10-11.
269. See id.
270. See Robert D. Novak, Partial Pro-Life Democrats, Creators.com (2007),
http://www.creators.com/opinion/robert-novak/partial-pro-life-democrats.html ("[Se-
venteen] Democratic senators voted for the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (as it passed, 64 to 34).
Their ranks included Sen. Patrick Leahy, the current Judiciary Committee chairman, and Sen. Joseph
Biden, a former chairman-both rated 100 percent for 2006 voting by NARAL Pro-Choice
America.").
271. See Ortiz, supra note 265, at 1115-16; see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971).
There is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law
because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck
down for this reason.. . it would presumably be valid as soon as the
legislature... repassed it for different reasons.
2 72
In Rounds, the Eighth Circuit readily accepted South Dakota's claims that
the purposes of the statute were to inform women about their pregnancies
and to prevent mental trauma caused by abortion. Likewise, in Crawford,
the Court deferred to Indiana's claim that the voter ID requirement was
meant to address voter fraud.
Despite these concerns, it makes sense for courts to be concerned
about legislative purpose when faced with a law alleged to infringe
important individual rights. At some level, the Supreme Court at least
implicitly applies a purpose test to every case alleging that a statute
infringes constitutional rights.273 Every law that treads on constitutional
rights must be supported by at least a rational basis. And this implicit
purpose test is usually not dependent upon particular facts presented by one
or more litigants or by hypothetical claimants. Instead, the test "focuses on
the overall weight of the government's interest in enacting a statute ... the
determination of which is independent of, and unaltered by, the
particularities of individual statutory applications., 274  If a law has no
legitimate purpose, therefore, its effects are irrelevant, since the law is not a
valid rule at all.275
Greater judicial scrutiny of legislative purpose can be employed in
several different ways. One possible approach is a more searching
evaluation of legislative purposes to determine whether a given justification
is a valid one. Ashutosh Bhagwat has argued that the Court has too readily
accepted asserted legislative purposes and has been too reluctant to
scrutinize the "strength and validity" of those purposes.276  Another
approach is to focus on the factual nexus between a statute's purposes and
the means chosen to effectuate it. David Faigman has faulted the Court for
272. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225.
273. But see Bhagwat, supra note 2 1, at 304 (asserting that while the constitutional tiers of
scrutiny "appear to include standards for the examination of government purposes," until recently
the Court "never got around to its promised analysis of the purposes").
274. Isserles, supra note 31, at 443.
275. Id. I do not here address how the Court should determine whether a given asserted
government interest qualifies as valid. Rather, my focus is on whether and how the Court should
determine that an admittedly legitimate stated purpose for a law is pretextual or lacks a factual
justification. Cf Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 325-56 (proposing framework for judicial
determination of illegitimate and proper government purposes advanced to justify burdens on
core individual rights).
276. Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 312.
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sometimes subsuming its purposes inquiry into the very definition of the
right at issue, thereby skirting an empirical examination of the "connection
between the government's purposes and the complained-of action." '277 A
third approach considers whether, given a concededly legitimate purpose,
that purpose either is pretextual or lacks a grounding in fact. Where a court
has reason to doubt a stated purpose, it has an independent basis to
invalidate the law in its entirety.
An example illustrates the distinctions among these three approaches.
Suppose a legislature bans an abortion procedure on the grounds that the
procedure harms women. Bhagwat's approach would ask whether
protecting women's health qualifies as a valid purpose that could outweigh
women's right to the procedure. Assuming it is, Faigman's analysis would
ask whether the law adequately addresses that concern. For example, a
court might consider doctors' testimony regarding whether the statute
reaches only that procedure or imperils other important procedures. My
approach takes a step back from these two and asks whether the legislature
even had reason to believe that the procedure endangered women's health.
If it did not, then it should not matter how important or legitimate the
purpose is in the abstract, or how well tailored the law is to meet that
purpose. The entire law should be invalidated in its entirety.
The question remains how a court can best smoke out a pretextual or
factually unsubstantiated purpose.278 One possibility is to look at whether a
legislative enactment has violated clearly established constitutional
precedent. 279 This may be a useful proxy for legislative purpose in contexts
like abortion, where a body of cases has established models for what valid
and invalid legislation looks like.28° In Ayotte, for example, there was
ample precedent (including Casey) demonstrating that a medical
emergency exception was constitutionally required.281 It seems fair to
277. David Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1521, 1531-32 (1992) ("The Court must review the nexus between the action and the
government's reasons for acting.").
278. See David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REv 41, 97 (2006) ("[T]he use of non-purpose-based doctrine [in First
Amendment context] to ferret out illicit purposes [] is useful because a candidly purpose-based
doctrine would confront the twin problems of false negatives and false positives: on the one hand,
impermissible governmental motives are notoriously difficult for litigants to prove, and on the
other hand, permissible ones are notoriously easy for legislatures to feign.").
279. See Note, After Ayotte, supra note 3, at 2569-70 (proposing that "purpose" prong of
Casey undue burden standard be deemed violated where statute is "inconsistent with clearly
established law").
280. See generally Devins, supra note 29.
281. The Court in Ayotte noted that, out of forty-four states with parental involvement laws,
only four (including New Hampshire's) lacked any kind of exception for medical emergencies).
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conclude that the New Hampshire legislature either overtly intended to
defy the law, or was at least reckless concerning whether its law violated
constitutional rights.
The clear constitutional precedent proxy will not work across the
board to identify illegitimate purposes for rights-infringing laws, however.
In cases in which the law is more unsettled or evolving, legislatures will be
at liberty to enact laws for doubtful reasons, knowing full invalidation is
unlikely. In such circumstances, courts can still ensure that laws are not
enacted purely due to animus or hostility by independently examining any
fact-based motives for rights-infringing laws. In essence, such independent
judicial scrutiny functions like a purpose test. A statute enacted for an
illegitimate purpose will often lack such a foundation, since the stated
purpose is pretextual. 282  If a fact-based justification falls apart when
examined carefully and impartially, it is appropriate for the courts to strike
down the law in its entirety. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized
that a mistaken or false factual premise for a law vitiates all of the law's
applications and warrants complete invalidation.283
There are many examples of rights-infringing laws for which
legislatures, likely having acted out of hostility toward the right in question,
have asserted a neutral-sounding, fact-based justification. For example,
states that have enacted laws infringing on the rights of gay and lesbian
persons to marry or to adopt children have typically claimed a desire to
protect children from harm or to provide them with the optimal parenting
arrangement. Courts that have refused to examine independently the
factual assertion that children raised by gay parents will be harmed have
typically upheld such laws.284 In stark contrast, courts that have conducted
independent factual examinations of this asserted justification have
invalidated the same kinds of laws.285
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 326 n.1 (2006). Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart I) has now called into question whether and when abortion restrictions require
a health or medical emergency exception. See Hill, supra note 104, at 322, 343.
282. See Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note 2, at 21-35 (presenting case
studies).
283. See Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966 (1984) ("The
flaw in the statute is not simply that it includes within its sweep some impermissible applications,
but that in all its applications it operates on a fundamentally mistaken premise that high
solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 961
(discussing statute's mistaken factual premise).
284. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 826 (11 th
Cir. 2004) (agreeing with trial court's decision to defer to legislature), aff'g Lofton v. Kearney,
157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006).
285. Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, slip op. at 54-59, 69 (Iowa April 3, 2009); Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d I (Ark. 2006); In re Adoption of John Doe and James Doe,
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Some will object that close judicial scrutiny of legislative purposes
violates rather than honors constitutional norms. They will claim that
courts conducting such an inquiry overstep the proper bounds of their
authority by interfering with democratic processes. But such scrutiny need
not and should not be unmoored from constitutional norms. Rather, "any
searching, judicial review of legislative purposes must be meaningfully
constrained by and grounded in the Constitution itself-the one source of
authority that properly trumps the decisions of democratically elected
bodies. '286 Nevertheless, if the requirement of at least a "legitimate
purpose" in order to infringe important individual rights is to have any
meaning, the courts cannot simply accept a stated purpose unquestioningly.
The constitutional norms that call for decisive judicial action in the
face of laws that unconstitutionally infringe important individual rights
may warrant a different approach in the context of laws that are rights-
protective. When the majority acts altruistically, that is, against its own
interests or in order to protect rights, the courts' duty to protect individuals
from majoritarian power is at its low ebb. The legislature is by definition
not motivated by bias or hostility toward such rights, and there is little
danger that a pretextual purpose will be offered to disguise animosity or
prejudice toward an unpopular group. This may be true, for example, when
Congress attempts to protect vulnerable or powerless individuals from state
oppression. In United States v. Raines, the Court addressed a challenge to
the 1957 Civil Rights Act, through which Congress attempted to provide
relief from race-based interference with voting rights.287 In Raines, it
seems appropriate for the Court to have saved the statute rather than to
invalidate it on its face.288 In contrast, courts wrongly enable defiant
legislatures when they refuse to invalidate in their entirety laws that
infringe important individual rights, especially where a legislature has
disregarded clear constitutional precedent or where an independent judicial
examination reveals no solid factual basis for the law.
Conclusion
Facial challenges have played a vital role in giving meaning to
constitutionally protected individual rights. The majoritarian process is
predisposed to produce laws from time to time that infringe core individual
slip op. at 51-52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (case number redacted); Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
286. Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 325.
287. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
288. Cf Metzger, supra note 13, at 901-02 (offering different analysis for why Court's
decision in Raines was correct).
rights. While sometimes those laws will curb rights out of necessity, in
order to accommodate a valid and commensurately weighty purpose, bias
and hostility will often-perhaps more often-infect the process. Courts
faced with challenges to rights-infringing laws can acknowledge this head-
on and independently examine stated legislative purposes, or they can turn
a blind eye and defer to the legislature's assertions. The latter approach
will encourage legislatures to thumb their nose at the U.S. Constitution,
knowing that they can infringe rights with impunity. The former approach,
when enforced through total invalidations, will promote constitutional
accountability among legislatures. It will also ensure that the courts fulfill
their crucial responsibility to protect individual rights from majoritarian
oppression.
The legislative process is an adversarial one that is not conducive to
neutral fact-finding, especially when controversial or minority rights are at
issue.289 The courts, on the other hand, are much better designed for that
purpose. In important cases, serious judicial examination of fact-based
legislative purposes has proven decisive when courts have undertaken it.
290
The Supreme Court should recognize how crucial such an inquiry is in the
context of rights-infringing laws and more systematically scrutinize the
legislative purposes the government presents their defense. Unfortunately,
the Roberts Court has so far taken the opposite tack. Under the guise of
preferring as-applied challenges, the Court has placed unrealistic and
troubling evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs in such cases, while accepting
uncritically legislatures' fact-based justifications for curbing individual
rights.
29'
Laws that infringe individual rights out of open defiance of clear
constitutional precedents, or because of inattention to the facts, are
fundamentally flawed and thus prime candidates for total invalidation.
Only the threat of complete invalidation in appropriate cases will motivate
Congress and state legislatures to make good on their obligation to uphold
the U.S. Constitution. And the Court will not make good on its own
obligation to protect individual rights unless it once again embraces facial
challenges.
289. See sources cited supra note 21.
290. See Borgmann, Legislative Fact-Finding, supra note 2, at 21-35 (presenting case studies
comparing outcomes when courts do and do not defer to legislative fact-finding).
291. Cf. Faigman, supra note 58, at 654, 655-58 (analyzing costs of Supreme Court's shifting
frame of reference in constitutional cases from level of"reviewable facts" to individual cases).
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